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WHERE’S THE FIRE?
Burt Neuborne*
INTRODUCTION
Freedom of speech is priceless, but distressingly fragile. Life—
and law—would be much simpler if we could react to free speech’s
importance and fragility by granting it absolute legal protection.
Since, however, absolute protection of speech is not—and should
not be—a serious option, we face the legal realist challenge of
erecting a First Amendment legal structure capable of providing
real-world protection to highly controversial speech, often by weak
speakers, without closing the door to government regulation—even
prohibition—of seriously harmful speech.
Developing elegant definitions of protected and unprotected
speech, while important, would not be enough to assure widespread,
real-world enjoyment of a right to speak freely. Given the
uncertainty and expense that necessarily exists in applying factdependent complex rules in protean factual settings, many potential
speakers would avoid being drawn into unpredictable and expensive
legal waters; many government officials would be tempted to invoke
the complex, fact-dependent rules for the wrong reasons; and many
judges might get the facts and the law wrong. To be effective in
protecting speech, I believe that any system of speech regulation
must provide breathing space between the rule itself, and the rule’s
application. That is why the emergence of modern First Amendment
“strict scrutiny” in Brandenburg v. Ohio, Cohen v. California, and
Texas v. Johnson was such a welcome development.1 When the legal
*Norman Dorsen Professor in Civil Liberties, New York University School of
Law.
1
I use the term “strict scrutiny” in this article as an amalgam of three historic
First Amendment tests: (a) incitement to imminent unlawful action; (b) speech
causing a clear and present danger of serious harm; and (c) a ban on resorting to
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dust clears, modern First Amendment strict scrutiny forces the
government to justify an act of censorship by persuading a
reviewing judge that regulation of speech is the least drastic means
of advancing a compelling governmental interest in dealing
effectively with an imminent threat of serious harm. If the
government cannot carry its persuasion burden on each of: (1) the
compelling nature of the government’s interest; (2) the absence of
less drastic means to protect the interest; (3) the effectiveness of
censorship in dealing with the problem; (4) the imminence, indeed
virtual certainty of the threatened harm; (5) a close causal link
between speech and feared harm; and (6) the seriousness of the
harm, the speech is deemed protected. Such a formula, with at least
six trap doors through which the government can fall, relies less on
precise definition, than on deflection of error. Strict scrutiny
operates to radically deflect regulatory error on all six issues in favor
of free speech; just as the due process requirement of “proof beyond
a reasonable doubt” in a criminal case radically deflects
prosecutorial error in favor of liberty.2 Just as we profess ourselves
willing under a reasonable doubt standard to see many guilty
persons acquitted in order to minimize the likelihood that an
innocent defendant will suffer an unjust conviction, under First
Amendment strict scrutiny we are willing to accept a considerable
degree of potentially harmful, unprotected speech in order to assure
that no protected speech is suppressed.
Not surprisingly given the doctrine’s intensely speechprotective nature, since the emergence of modern strict scrutiny in
Texas v. Johnson, only two government-imposed speech
censorship unnecessarily. The three tests merged during the twenty years from
Brandenburg to Texas v. Johnson, emerging as the strict scrutiny standard of
review described infra. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399, 404 (1989)
(invalidating flag burning conviction); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26
(1971) (invalidating conviction for wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words
“Fuck the Draft” in a courthouse); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48
(1969) (per curiam) (striking down criminal syndicalism conviction). The
operation of First Amendment strict scrutiny doctrine is described briefly infra at
note 12.
2
The error deflection role of the guilt beyond a reasonable doubt standard
was articulated by Justice Brennan in his opinion for the Court in In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970), and reiterated in Justice Harlan’s influential
concurrence. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372–74 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring).
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restrictions—a ban on electioneering too close to the polls and a ban
on personal campaign fundraising by sitting judges—have survived
modern “strict scrutiny.”3
Moreover, in free speech settings where traditional “as applied”
application of strict scrutiny risks being ineffective in protecting
vulnerable, out-of-court speakers who may lack the resources and/or
sophistication to seek judicial free speech protection on their own,
the Court has expanded its speech-protective reach by enunciating
five First Amendment procedural doctrines—the ban on prior
restraints, overbreadth, vagueness, due process, and strict equality—
that focus, not on the protect nature of the speech before the Court,
but on the procedures used by the government to regulate the
speech.4 In my experience, the First Amendment procedural
corollaries have operated over the years to make vibrant free speech
protection a reality for many vulnerable speakers who otherwise
might well have fallen through the system’s substantive cracks.5
That is all to the good.
I believe, however, that the First Amendment procedural
corollaries—especially overbreadth, vagueness, and equality—are
being invoked reflexively today in cases like R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, United States v. Stevens, and Reed v. Gilbert, discussed in
Parts I and III,6 in cases and settings where the application of strict
3

Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015) (finding the
statute prohibiting judges and judicial candidates from personal solicitation of
campaign funds constitutional); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193, 195
(1992) (finding the statute prohibiting electioneering—solicitation of votes and
displaying or distributing campaign materials within 100 feet of polling places—
constitutional). It is possible to characterize Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000)
(upholding ban on “knowingly approaching” persons for purposes of leafletting
or speaking in vicinity of abortion clinic) as a third example. I do not, however,
read Justice Steven’s majority opinion as applying strict scrutiny.
4
The genesis and operation of the five First Amendment procedural
corollaries are briefly described infra in Parts II and III.
5
See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 567–68, 582 (1974) (invalidating
flag desecration statute on its face); Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S.
92, 92–94 (1972) (invalidating anti-picketing statute on its face); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 91–92, 101 (1940) (invalidating anti-picketing statute on
its face).
6
Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015) (invalidating restrictions on
size and placement of signs); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 464–67, 482
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scrutiny to the speech before the Court would be fully capable of
providing effective free speech protection to all concerned. In the
absence of a showing that vulnerable out-of-court speakers or
hearers exist who would be unlikely to be able to assert their own
free speech rights effectively, I believe that it is both unnecessary
and unwise to resort to facial procedural review at the cost of: (1)
impeding the case-by-case development of substantive First
Amendment doctrine; and (2) providing potentially unprotected
speakers with an unjust windfall.
Part I of this article provides a snapshot of the current state of
free speech protection, briefly noting the seminal cases, and
summarizing free speech jurisprudence since the emergence of
modern strict scrutiny in Brandenburg, Cohen v. California, and
Texas v. Johnson. Part II reviews the speech-protective rules—both
facial and as applied—that First Amendment lawyers like me
routinely invoke in modern free speech cases. Part III briefly
describes the five First Amendment procedural corollaries and the
seminal cases in which the Court first recognized them. I argue that,
given the purpose for which they were created, the procedural
corollaries, especially First Amendment overbreadth, vagueness,
and equality, should be deployed facially only in settings where the
free speech rights of vulnerable, out-of-court speakers or hearers are
endangered by the very existence of flawed First Amendment
regulatory procedures. In the absence of a need to protect vulnerable
out-of-court speakers, I believe the Court should be reluctant to
provide a procedural windfall to marginal speakers who’s own
speech might well be subject to lawful regulation under strict
scrutiny. Speakers like the cross burners in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
and the purveyors of cruelty to animals in United States v. Stevens,
should, I believe, rise and fall on their own strict scrutiny free speech
merits. Why give them a procedural windfall?

(2010) (overturning conviction for display of material depicting torture of small
animals); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379, 381 (1992) (overturning
conviction for cross burning on sidewalk abutting black family’s residence). I
discuss R.A.V. briefly in infra Part I, and discuss Stevens and Reed briefly in infra
Part III.
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I. THE CURRENT STATE OF FREE SPEECH PROTECTION
The provocative, and to my mind, somewhat alarmist title of this
symposium, “Free Speech Under Fire: The Future of the First
Amendment,” implies that freedom of speech is currently under
siege in the United States. I believe, to the contrary, that, despite the
election of Donald Trump as President, legal protection of our First
Amendment freedoms has never been more secure. We live, today,
in a kaleidoscopic political, cultural, religious, information, and
entertainment bazaar unmatched in human history. Public support
for the idea of free speech has never been higher.7 Anchored by
Justice Anthony Kennedy,8 we have never had a more speechprotective Supreme Court.9 In the quarter-century since the iconic

7

The annual 2015 Newseum poll of attitudes affecting the First Amendment
reports strong support for free speech by over 75% of the population. See
NEWSEUM INST., THE 2015 STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 14–15 (2015),
http://www.newseuminstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/FAC_SOFA15_report.pdf.
8
See Ashutosh Bhagwat & Matthew Struhar, Symposium, Justice Kennedy’s
Free Speech Jurisprudence: A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis, 44
MCGEORGE L. REV. 167, 168–69 (2013) (demonstrating Justice Kennedy’s strong
commitment to the protection of free speech). Despite Justice Kennedy’s very
distinguished free speech record, he has: (1) restricted the ability of public
employees to criticize their bosses. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413, 421
(2006) (denying free speech protection to assistant prosecutor who publicly
questioned the accuracy of facts in an application for a search warrant); and (2)
acquiesced in cases severely restricting the free speech rights of high school
students, prisoners, and labor unions. See Knox v. Serv. Emps., 132 S. Ct. 2277,
2284, 2296 (2012) (invalidating special assessment for political uses imposed by
public employee union); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397–98 (2007)
(upholding ten-day suspension of student for displaying sign at school-supervised
off campus event)); Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 524–25 (2006) (upholding
policy of denying newspapers and magazines to “worst behaving” prisoners); see
also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2010) (banning
peaceful association with foreign groups labelled as terrorist); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (treating principal as publisher of high
school newspaper).
9
The authors of the McGeorge Law Review article, Ashutosh Bhagwat and
Matthew Struhar, discussed at supra note 8, calculate that the Supreme Court
decided 147 First Amendment issues between 1988-2013; ruling in favor of the
First Amendment more than fifty percent of the time. See Bhagwat & Struhar,
supra note 8, at 168–69.
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five-four decisions in the flag burning cases,10 both the liberal and
conservative wings of the Court11 have enthusiastically applied First
Amendment “strict scrutiny” to forge a potent free speech
jurisprudence.12
What is—and should be—under fire, though, is the misuse of a
potent free speech clause and its five procedural corollaries as
modern substitutes for the discredited doctrine of substantive due

10

See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990) (invalidating
federal flag desecration statute); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989)
(invalidating Texas flag desecration statute).
11
I characterize five of the Justices who were appointed by Republican
Presidents (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and
Kennedy) as “conservatives;” and the four appointed by Democratic Presidents
(Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) as “liberals.” The Republican
= conservative; Democrat = liberal label is, of course, subject to important
exceptions. Earl Warren, John Paul Stevens, Harry Blackmun, and David Souter
were appointed by Republican Presidents, but evolved into liberal Justices,
Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Ideological Imbalance, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/03/democrats
_always_pick_moderates_like_merrick_garland.html. Byron White was appointed
by President Kennedy, but occasionally cast conservative votes. Lyle Denniston,
The Mystery of Justice Byron White, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (May 3, 2012),
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2012/05/the-mystery-of-justice-byron-white/.
Despite the mavericks, Political party affiliation, especially in today’s polarized
climate, often signals something important about a Justice’s likely voting pattern
in hard constitutional cases. See Burt Neuborne, Lecture, The Cooper Union,
Three Constitutions: Republican; Democratic; and Consensus, YOUTUBE (Jan.
11, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9PhiyuMEU-I.
12
For recent examples of First Amendment strict scrutiny in action, see
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (invalidating
aggregate ceiling on campaign contributions in single year); and United States v.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (invalidating criminal conviction for having
falsely claimed to have been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor). The
seminal modern applications of strict scrutiny took place in Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (striking down criminal syndicalism
conviction), Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (invalidating conviction for
wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words “Fuck the Draft” in a courthouse);
and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating flag burning conviction).
In cases like Hazelwood School District, Morse, Garcettii, and Beard, discussed
in supra note 8, speakers at the bottom of a hierarchy, like high school students,
prisoners, and public employees, appear to enjoy diminished First Amendment
protection. Their speech does not appear to qualify for strict scrutiny.
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process.13 Until 1937, a majority of the Supreme Court repeatedly
invoked the concept of substantive due process as an all-purpose
judge-made deregulatory device, repeatedly blocking efforts by
Congress and state legislatures to enact economic legislation
protecting the weak against the powerful.14 While the bulk of
substantive due process cases arose in an economic context, two of
the Court’s earliest efforts to protect what we would, today, see as
First Amendment freedoms—the right to educate your child in a
religious school, and the right to study and teach the German
language—were decided during the 1920s as a matter of substantive
due process.15
As early as 1925, however, in Gitlow v. New York, Justices
Holmes and Brandeis, concerned over the open-ended nature of
substantive due process, persuaded the Court that the free speech
clause of the First Amendment applied both to the states (through
the Fourteenth Amendment) and to the federal government,
providing the Court with a textually based alternative to the
amorphous idea of substantive due process protection.16 Once
13

In a nutshell, the concept of substantive due process ascribes a judiciallydefined substantive component to the protection of “liberty” in the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, preventing government from
interfering with anything falling within a judge’s understanding of “liberty,” even
when the government uses scrupulously fair procedures. For a classic description
of the evolution of substantive due process, see generally EDWARD S. CORWIN,
LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT: THE RISE, FLOWERING AND DECLINE OF A
FAMOUS JUDICIAL CONCEPT (1948).
14
For well-known applications of substantive due process in economic
contexts, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (invalidating 60-hour
maximum on baker’s workweek); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180
(1908) (invalidating federal statute banning “yellow dog” contracts promising not
to join union); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (invalidating state ban
on “yellow dog” contracts); and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 562
(1923) (invalidating minimum wage statute).
15
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (invalidating ban
on educating children in religious schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402
(1923) (invalidating restriction on study of German).
16
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925) (upholding
constitutionality of New York’s criminal syndicalism statute under the First
Amendment); see also id. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting that First
Amendment applies to New York State through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment,

138

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Supreme Court protection of religious and intellectual freedom
became anchored in the text of the First Amendment, it became
unnecessary in most noneconomic settings to resort to substantive
due process.17 Instead, in noneconomic settings, the Court
concentrated on enforcing “fundamental” provisions of the Bill of
Rights18 deemed binding on the states through “selective
incorporation” by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.19 In 1937, beginning with NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co.,20 the Supreme Court dramatically restricted the
deregulatory reach of substantive due process in an economic
context, ending its use as a wide-ranging device blocking regulation
of the market to protect weak participants.
the Court had ruled that the Bill of Rights binds the federal government, but not
the states. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250–51 (1833) (holding that
the First Amendment does not bind state or local government).
17
See generally Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 667 (1925) (subjecting New York
Criminal Syndicalism Statute to First Amendment scrutiny); McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 743 (2010) (holding Second Amendment fully applicable
to states).
18
See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 147, 152 n. 4 (1938)
(promising vigorous Supreme Court protection of “enumerated rights,” and the
rights of “discrete and insular minorities”).
19
For the origins of “selective incorporation,” see Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78 (1908); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). For the history of “selective incorporation,” see
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010), applying the Second
Amendment to the states. The process of selective incorporation substitutes those
“fundamental” textual protections of the Bill of Rights deemed necessary for a
free society for an amorphous, judge-made idea of liberty. As Justice Thomas’
perceptive separate opinion in McDonald demonstrates, both substantive due
process and selective incorporation ultimately rest on highly subjective judicial
decision-making. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 811 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Thomas argued for overruling the Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. 36 (1872), making possible a renaissance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
“privileges and immunities” clause as the source of constitutional limits on state
behavior. Id. at 851–52 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). It’s hard to see,
though, why the judicial process of giving meaning to the words “privileges and
immunities” would be less subjective than giving meaning to the word “liberty”
in enforcing substantive due process, or deciding what is “fundamental” enough
to qualify for selective incorporation.
20
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937) (upholding constitutionality of National Labor Relations Act).
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While the modern Court has sporadically invoked substantive
due process in a noneconomic context to protect a vulnerable
individual against majority oppression,21 and while the Court’s
privacy jurisprudence may be nothing more than substantive due
process in disguise,22 the modern Court has been extremely reluctant
to embrace the judge-made, open-ended nature of substantive due
process.23 In recent years, though, I fear that five Supreme Court
Justices—Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas and Alito—have misread seven of the ten words that
comprise the First Amendment’s free speech clause 24 as a twentyfirst century version of pre-1937 economic substantive due process,
repeatedly construing the First Amendment as a broad deregulatory
device protecting powerful speakers, with little or no concern for the
consequences of deregulation on the weak.25
21

See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invoking
substantive due process to protect the right of close family members to live
together is protected by substantive due process).
22
See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The “New” Substantive Due Process and the
Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 BYU L. REV. 43, 45 (1976); Louis
Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1410 (1974); Ira C.
Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV.
981, 994 (1979).
23
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (rejecting right
of assisted suicide); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 111 (1989) (rejecting
substantive due process claim by biological father).
24
The free speech clause of the First Amendment states: “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
current Court tends to ignore the three words “the freedom of,” a legal abstraction
requiring judgment about what falls inside or outside the “freedom of speech,” in
favor of the more absolute “Congress shall make no law abridging . . . speech.”
BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S MUSIC ch. 3 (2015).
25
See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1461–
62 (2014) (invalidating the generous ceiling on the sums an individual can
contribute to federal candidates in a single year); Ariz. Free Enter. Club v.
Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011) (invalidating campaign subsidies designed to match
the spending of a well-funded candidate); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554
U.S. 724 (2008) (invalidating efforts to allow ordinary candidates to keep pace
with the spending of hugely wealthy opponents); Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down efforts to wall-off vast corporate
wealth from political campaigns); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)
(complicating efforts to shield vulnerable hearers from face-to-face hate speech);
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2540–41 (2014) (striking down a law
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The era of substantive due process should have taught us that
excessive deregulation of important activities—even speech—risks
a Hobbesean world where the strong do what they will, and
everyone else suffers what they must. Speech is no exception. As
with any excessive commitment to deregulation, the elimination of
government as a regulatory force creates a regulatory power
vacuum, enabling extremely powerful speakers to leverage their
words into disproportionate and, occasionally, destructive power.
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan have, on the
other hand, rejected the purely deregulatory approach to free
speech.26 Instead, as the dissents in McCutcheon; Arizona Free
Enterprise, and Citizens United demonstrate, they have read the
First Amendment as codifying an aspirational ideal that permits—
indeed, sometimes encourages—carefully limited government
regulation of extremely powerful speakers in aid of the Founders’
First Amendment vision of a “city on the hill:” a polity of free
thought and respect for conscience; robust and vigorous political
discussion; egalitarian self-government; individual self-realization;
imaginative artistic endeavor; reciprocal toleration; and mutual
respect.
In short, unlike the five deregulatory Justices, the four
aspirational Justices worry about the consequences of a wholly
aimed at shielding vulnerable women entering an abortion clinic from being
forced to engage in face-to-face confrontations with opponents of abortion);
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (invaliding bans on
marketing violent, misogynistic video games to children); United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (striking down the ban on movies depicting the
torture and death of small animals); Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2013
(2015) (complicating the imposition of criminal punishment for publishing thinlyveiled threats on the Internet aimed at an ex-spouse); United States v. Alvarez,
132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (blocking efforts to punish willful lying about receiving
the Congressional Medal of Honor); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)
(eliminating common law limits on virulent anti-gay demonstrations carefully
timed to enhance the grief of families burying young servicemen killed in
Afghanistan).
26
See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(defending constitutionality of aggregate contribution limits as needed to prevent
corruption and undue influence); Ariz. Free Enter., 564 U.S. at 755 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (defending constitutionality of matching fund subsidy program));
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 393–94 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (defending
constitutionality of ban on for-profit corporate electoral spending).
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deregulated speech process for American democracy and the society
it serves.27 Most of the time, the aspirational and deregulatory
Justices agree about the importance of protecting free speech. That
is why both wings of the Court have repeatedly applied the speechprotective “strict scrutiny” formula in cases like McCutcheon v.
FEC, Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett, Davis v. FEC,
Citizens United v. FEC, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, McCullen v. Coakley,
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants’ Association, United States v.
Stevens, Elonis v. United States, United States v. Alvarez, and
Snyder v. Phelps. However, as the dissents in each of those cases
demonstrate, applying strict scrutiny is not always a simple matter.
It forces a Justice to decide, at a minimum, what constitutes a
compelling governmental interest, whether less drastic means exist,
and whether a speech restriction is necessary to avoid an imminent
and highly likely harm. Despite the complexity of the task, though,
First Amendment strict scrutiny enjoys broad, and well-deserved,
support. One can agree or disagree with a given majority’s definition
of what constitutes a compelling governmental interest, whether less
drastic means exist to advance that interest, or whether the feared
harm is sufficiently imminent, without disagreeing with the speechprotective formula itself. No one wants to return to the “bad
tendency” test that brought us Schenck, Debs, Gitlow, and Dennis.28
Thus, despite my disagreement with aspects of its recent application,
I come to praise First Amendment strict scrutiny; not to bury it.
Sometimes, though, the Justices, confronted by a government
effort to regulate speech in certain disfavored contexts, have not
gone down the strict scrutiny road. Burning flags may trigger strict
scrutiny; but burning draft cards did not.29 And, as we’ve seen,
when dealing with speech at the bottom of a hierarchy in cases like
27

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
See Shenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding conviction for
anti-war leafletting); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (upholding
conviction for anti-draft speech); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
(upholding conviction for membership in radical organization); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding conviction for serving as official of
Communist Party).
29
Compare Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down flag
burning conviction), with O’Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
(upholding conviction for burning draft card).
28
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Garcetti, Morse v. Frederick, Beard v. Banks, and Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court actually applies something
troublingly close to the old “bad tendency” test.30 I will leave to
others the task of challenging such a two-tier First Amendment. In
this brief essay, I focus on a second set of cases declining to invoke
strict scrutiny, relying instead on procedural prophylaxis.
Occasionally, in cases like R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, instead of
conducting an “as applied” strict scrutiny inquiry into the
constitutionally protected nature of the speech before it, the Court
elects to review the legitimacy of the First Amendment regulatory
process “on its face.” If the Court finds that the regulatory process
violates one of the five First Amendment procedural corollaries
discussed above, it strikes down the procedure on its face, providing
the speech before the Court with a form of de facto First Amendment
protection without asking whether the speech would be entitled to
substantive First Amendment protection under strict scrutiny.31
While the speech before the Court in such a facial review case does
not receive formal substantive legal protection, the speaker wins the
case, and the speech itself escapes future regulation unless and until
the government develops a procedurally acceptable way to do so.
The Court has never articulated principled First Amendment
criteria for deciding when to carry out “as applied” strict scrutiny
review of the constitutionally protected nature of speech before it,
and when to unlimber the heavy artillery of procedural “facial”
30

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the propriety of shifting the Court’s attention from an
“as applied” analysis of the speech before it, to a “facial” consideration of the
process by which the speech is being regulated, see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601 (1973) (declining to apply First Amendment overbreadth to state law
regulating government employee participation in partisan politics). The Court’s
usual preference in non-First Amendment settings is for “as applied” review of
the fact pattern before it. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)
(upholding constitutionality of Bail Reform Act “as applied” to litigants before it;
reversing Second Circuit’s finding of “facial” invalidity). Controversy over when
to invoke “facial” review, instead of “as applied” scrutiny, is not confined to First
Amendment settings—it exists across the spectrum of the law. See Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (applying facial review to invalidate Delaware’s
practice of basing quasi in rem jurisdiction on fictive presence of shares of stock
in Delaware corporation); Whole Woman’s Health Ctr. v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct.
2292 (2016) (discussing relationship between as applied and facial claims).
31
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review.32 I believe that such principled criteria exist. Based on my
concededly subjective reading of the seminal Supreme Court cases,
discussed infra in part III, in which the most important procedural
corollaries were developed, I believe that the Court should eschew
“as applied” review in favor of “facial” process-based review only
when the First Amendment regulatory process before the Court
poses a plausible threat to the ability of vulnerable out-of-court
speakers to engage in clearly protected speech. I question whether
powerful speakers, capable of effectively asserting their own free
speech rights “as applied,” and/or so-called low value speakers,
engaged in marginal forms of speech that may well be unprotected,
should be able to avoid subjecting their speech to “as applied”
review by invoking “facial” First Amendment procedural doctrines
like vagueness or overbreadth.
II. THE MODERN FIRST AMENDMENT LAWYER’S TOOL BOX
First Amendment lawyers like me33 tend to deploy a predictable
progression of legal arguments in resisting government efforts to
regulate the process of communication. When retained by a client to
challenge a regulation adversely affecting the transmission of
information or ideas, I very often, as a first move, invoke the closely
related First Amendment procedural doctrines of void-for-

32

In addition to Broadrick, the Court has episodically declined to apply
facial review in a number of First Amendment settings, without developing
principled criteria governing the choice between as applied and facial review.
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 632–33; see Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 323–24 (1991);
Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484–85 (1989); Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504–05 (1985). The Court’s most dramatic
refusal to apply procedural prophylaxis occurred in the context of child
pornography. See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (declining
to invoke overbreadth).
33
I hope that my skepticism about the invocation of the First Amendment as
a deregulatory device in the service of Ayn Rand’s vision of society has not
resulted in my expulsion from the First Amendment lawyers club. As a matter of
long-term strategy, I continue to believe that the best way to preserve a robust
First Amendment is to avoid deploying it as an ideological weapon in either the
libertarian or egalitarian arsenal.
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vagueness and overbreadth.34 I do so strategically, in order to shift
the reviewing court’s focus from my client’s often controversial,
possibly unprotected speech, to potential future exercises of
censorship that no one would support—like banning William
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet because the play deals with teenage
sex or teenage suicide. I parse the text of the statute, regulation, or
policy at issue, note triumphantly that the text or rationale is broad
enough, or vague enough, to be read by some overly aggressive
future official to authorize the censorship of Romeo and Juliet, and
argue that since the very existence of the regulation poses an
unacceptable threat to clearly protected free speech, the regulation
must be erased immediately on its face, without ever asking whether
our client’s speech would—or should—be subject to regulation
under a narrower or more precisely drawn regulation.35 I hesitate to
admit to the number of times I have written the following sentence:
“The speech regulation before the Court, read literally by a
government official, is an invitation to suppress a wide variety of
clearly protected exercises of free speech, including Romeo and
Juliet.”
Second, if a speech-regulatory statute, regulation, or policy
escapes the Scylla and Charybdis of vagueness and overbreadth,36 I
scan the universe of similar speech and similarly situated speakers,
and announce triumphantly that the regulation fails to treat all
similarly situated speakers (or all similar speech) identically. I argue
that such a speech-selective regulation is either evidence of
improper intent, or an invitation to censorship of disfavored ideas or
disfavored speakers, and insist that, unless the government can posit
34

See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100
YALE L.J. 853, 903–04 (2001) (explaining the doctrines of vagueness and
overbreadth).
35
See Note, Overbreadth and Listeners’ Rights, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1749,
1752 (2010).
36
In my experience, efforts to avoid drafting unduly vague statutes using
abstract language often lead drafters to the use of precise but overbroad language.
Efforts to avoid overbreadth often cause drafters to use overly vague general
language. The difficulty of drafting a campaign finance regulation that is both
precise and not overbroad is a classic example of the Scylla/Charybdis problem
in action. See Richard L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical
Evidence to Determine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws
Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1773, 1779 (2000).
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an extremely powerful explanation for the differential treatment, the
selective regulation should also be erased on its face as an
unacceptable threat to free speech, once again without ever asking
whether our client’s speech might—or should—be subject to
regulation under a more comprehensive statute.37
Only if I cannot find a First Amendment procedural hole within
which to bury the regulation on its face38 do I invoke relevant
substantive First Amendment doctrine to test whether the speech in
question is actually protected. Once upon a time, that was a
thankless task. Under the test that has become known as the “bad
tendency” test, applied by the Court in Schenck, Debs, and Gitlow,
speech was unprotected if it had a mere “bad tendency” to induce
hearers to engage in unlawful or harmful behavior.39 Unfortunately,
it’s still a thankless task if you are representing students,
government employees, labor picketers, demonstrators, or
prisoners.40 Since Brandenburg v. Ohio,41 and Cohen v. California,
however, in most other settings, I am able to invoke First
37

See, e.g., Minneapolis Star Tribune v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575 (1983) (invalidating a tax on large newspapers because smaller
publications are not similarly taxed). I call such an attack on the differential reach
of a speech regulation the “underbreadth” doctrine. For scholarly discussion of
First Amendment equality, see Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle
in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975), and Geoffrey R. Stone,
Kenneth Karsts’ Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 45 (2008). A variant of the First Amendment equality doctrine uses
differential treatment of speakers (or speech) to trigger strict scrutiny in settings
where a lesser standard of review might otherwise apply. Justice Kennedy’s
unfortunate decision in Citizens United, citing differential treatment of individuals
and corporations as a justification for invoking strict scrutiny, is an example of
underbreadth reasoning in action. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558
U.S. 310, 364 (2010).
38
Other well-known First Amendment procedural arguments include the
virtually absolute ban on prior restraints, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283
U.S. 697, 712–13 (1931), and a First Amendment due process requirement calling
for the speedy and fair resolution of disputed factual and legal issues before
censorship can be imposed, see Lee Art Theater v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 637
(1968) (per curiam).
39
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919); Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 671 (1925).
40
See supra Part I.
41
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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Amendment “strict scrutiny,” forcing the government to bear a
much heavier burden of justification.42
The speech-protective power of First Amendment strict scrutiny
was on display in United States v. Alvarez,43 where the
government’s inability to articulate a compelling interest for caring
whether a speaker lied about being awarded a Congressional Medal
of Honor turned appallingly low-value speech (conscious lying) into
a protected form of dignitary self-realization.44 Similarly, in Brown
v. Entertainment Merchants’ Association,45 the power of strict
scrutiny required the government to prove that violent video games
replete with misogyny actually affect a child’s psychological
approach to violence and gender equity. Plausible concern was not
enough.46 That is a very hard evidentiary burden to carry. Indeed, as
I have noted, since Brandenburg, only two government speech
regulations have survived the formal invocation of Supreme Court
strict scrutiny.47
Powerful as it is, however, the fatal impact of strict scrutiny may
be overstated.48 Much speech that might flunk strict scrutiny, like
the cross burning in R.A.V., the depiction of animal cruelty in
Stevens, or the signage in Reed, never has to face strict scrutiny
because it receives a de facto pass under one or another facial First
Amendment procedural corollary. In the modern era, the Supreme
Court has routinely deployed the five First Amendment procedural
corollaries to create a deregulatory penumbra that facially
42

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012).
44
Id. at 2543, 2547–48.
45
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799–800 (2011).
46
Id.
47
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
48
It is worth remembering that both Dennis v. United States and Korematsu
v. United States both purported to apply strict scrutiny. Dennis duly recited the
“clear and present danger” formula, but permitted the legislature, instead of the
courts, to decide whether a sufficient risk of harm existed to justify the jailing of
the leadership of the American Communist Party. Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 517 (1951). Korematsu duly recited the Equal Protection strict scrutiny
formula, but the military bluffed the Court away from the table by falsely claiming
an overwhelming security need to confine American citizens of Japanese ancestry
to concentration camps. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 223
(1944).
43
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invalidates efforts at regulating potentially unprotected speech
without asking (much less deciding) whether the speech before the
Court would survive strict scrutiny.49 I believe that harmful,
possibly unprotected, speech would be better managed, vulnerable
hearers better protected, and unjust windfalls avoided, if the Court
were to think twice before inviting First Amendment lawyers like
me to routinely invoke prophylactic procedural doctrines to avoid
confronting hard, substantive First Amendment questions.
III. THE PROPER ROLE OF THE FIVE FIRST AMENDMENT
PROCEDURAL COROLLARIES
A common theme runs through the five First Amendment
procedural corollaries. Each is designed to assure that vulnerable
speakers or hearers, who are unlikely to find their own way into
court, actually enjoy substantive First Amendment protection. The
ban on prior restraints prevents the suppression of speech before
hearers have a chance to demand access to it.50 The overbreadth
doctrine prevents officials from being encouraged to censor the
clearly protected speech of vulnerable speakers who may lack the
resources or sophistication to protect their rights in court.51 The
void-for-vagueness doctrine prevents self-censorship by vulnerable
speakers, who may refrain from potentially forbidden speech
because they lack the resources to contest censorship in court.52 The
First Amendment equality doctrine protects vulnerable speakers
49

See, e.g., Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015) (finding ordinance
imposing differential signage facially invalid under First Amendment equality
doctrine); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (finding that a
statute banning the so-called “crush” movies depicting cruelty to small animals
facially vague); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (finding that
a statute used to prosecute individuals burning crosses aimed at terrorizing black
neighbors was facially overbroad).
50
See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726–27 (1971); Near
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713–14 (1931).
51
Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987); see
Henry Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1–2 (1981).
52
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 484–85 (2010); see also
Anthony Amsterdam, The “Void-for-Vagueness” Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75 (1960) (highlighting how vagueness can void a statute
and implicate speech concerns of out-of-court speakers).
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with limited resources against becoming the targets of improperly
motivated censorship.53 Finally, First Amendment due process
assures careful judicial consideration before speech is removed from
circulation.54
An important jurisprudential difference exists between
substantive protection of free speech, which must be applied equally
to all, and the five procedural corollaries, which are judge-made
prophylactic rules designed to reinforce the enjoyment of
substantive First Amendment protection by resource-poor speakers
who might not be in a position to assert their First Amendment
rights. As such, the procedural corollaries are jurisprudentially
similar to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule,55 and the Fifth
Amendment’s prophylactic ban on interrogation in the absence of
counsel.56 In all three constitutional settings, the Court deploys a
form of procedural prophylaxis designed to assure that weak
participants enjoy important substantive constitutional protections
that might not otherwise be enforceable in court.
In Mapp v. Ohio, the Court justified the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule by noting that, in its absence, no effective method
of enforcing criminal defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights would
exist.57 A similar Fifth Amendment justification underlies the
Miranda rule.58 As judge-made exercises in pragmatic prophylaxis,
both the Fourth and Fifth Amendment procedural rules have been
subject to judicial fine-tuning to assure that, in the Justices’ view,
53

See Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972); see
also Karst, supra note 37, at 24–25 (highlighting how equality theories protect all
speakers from censorship).
54
See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965); Henry Monaghan,
First Amendment “Due Process”, 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 520 (1970).
55
See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule barring the use of evidence obtained through
unconstitutional means is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
56
See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (concluding that
there must be safeguards during in-custody interrogations so that those accused
of crimes are adequately apprised of their rights and the exercise of those rights
are fully honored).
57
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655; see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393
(1914).
58
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
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they operate only when necessary, and do not confer unjustified
legal windfalls on persons whose conduct is not constitutionally
protected. The emergence of the good faith exception to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule is a classic, if controversial, example
of such procedural tinkering in action.59
I believe the five First Amendment procedural corollaries grew
out of a similar judicial recognition that, absent prophylactic facial
review of First Amendment procedures, a combination of weak
speakers, controversial forms of speech, vague, fact-dependent
constitutional protections, and an intensely hostile regulatory
climate would generate an unacceptably high level of risk that many
resource-poor persons would be unable to enjoy and enforce their
substantive free speech rights effectively.60 Thus, the prior restraint
doctrine is not really about protecting speakers; it protects
vulnerable hearers. After defeating a prior restraint, the speaker
must be prepared to establish the substantively protected nature of
the speech, or suffer a subsequent sanction.61 Similarly, the First
Amendment due process doctrine protects vulnerable hearers by
assuring that potentially protected speech is not physically taken out
of circulation before a neutral judge has a chance to pass on the legal
and factual issues raised by the effort to limit communication.62
Once again, the doctrine’s principal beneficiaries are hearers who
would be denied access to the speech, almost always without
judicial recourse, in the absence of careful prophylactic procedural
protections that parallel the ban on prior restraints. The bans on prior
restraints and First Amendment due process, while extremely
valuable, are, in my experience, relatively rarely invoked these days.
In today’s world, given the extraordinary burden of justification
imposed in Near v. Minnesota and the New York Times v. United
59

See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (concluding that
the benefit of suppressing evidence obtained in good faith does not justify the
costs of exclusion).
60
I discuss the Warren Court’s deployment of First Amendment doctrine to
protect the civil rights movement in Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of
Race on the Warren Court, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 77–82 (2011).
61
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733 (1971)
(White, J., concurring).
62
See A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 213 (1964); Marcus v.
Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732–33 (1961).
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States (the Pentagon Papers case), the government rarely seeks a
prior restraint. Similarly, the procedural requirement of fair, timely,
speedy, and careful fact-finding and law declaration in connection
with government censorship efforts, while important, is only rarely
brought into play in a legal system that has internalized basic due
process norms.
In my experience, though, the remaining three procedural
corollaries—overbreadth, vagueness, and equal treatment—are
routine staples of a modern First Amendment lawyer’s toolbox. As
I’ve confessed, I tend to invoke them first, before turning to the
substantive issue of First Amendment protection. Should I be
encouraged, or permitted to do so in every First Amendment case,
or should the procedural corollaries be deployed in a narrower
subset of First Amendment cases? It is, I believe, no coincidence
that the seminal First Amendment overbreadth, vagueness, and
equality cases protected the speech of religious zealots engaged in
house-to-house speech,63 labor organizers engaged in picketing,64
civil rights demonstrators,65 and opponents of the Vietnam War,66
all of whom were seeking to utilize body rhetoric—such as
picketing, parading, and mass meetings—to advance contested
social goals in the teeth of intensely hostile police responses to both
the message and the messenger. I believe that the Supreme Court
understood that maintaining a robust First Amendment space for
body rhetoric in hostile settings not only comports with the First
63

See, e.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 141–49 (1943) (holding that
door to door distribution of religious literature is protected by the First
Amendment); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 157–65 (1939) (holding
that an ordinance barring canvassing without a permit is void as applied to the
distribution of religious booklets by a church member).
64
See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 93–102 (1940) (demonstrating
that labor picketing protected by the First Amendment and is among the
fundamental personal rights and liberties secured by the Fourteenth Amendment);
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 512 (1939) (demonstrating that
labor speech is protected by the U.S. Constitution).
65
See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (reversing convictions of
civil rights demonstrators).
66
See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (reversing convictions
of anti-Vietnam demonstrators); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971)
(holding that an ordinance making it a criminal offense for individuals to assemble
on sidewalks and annoy passersby was unconstitutional on its face).
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Amendment’s free speech and free assembly clauses; it is crucially
important to making free speech available to the poor and less
educated. Most speech, including speech on the Internet and social
media, depends on a level of verbal sophistication that varies
directly with educational status. Persons at the bottom of the
educational ladder often lack the verbal sophistication needed to
couch their ideas in persuasive verbal form. Perhaps more
importantly, even with the Internet, much effective speech is not
free. Access to a wide audience usually costs money, but not
everyone can afford to buy space or time in, or on, an organ of mass
communication.
Sweat equity and body rhetoric can, however, substitute for hard
cash in transmitting a message to the public. To me, at least, the
moral integrity of the First Amendment requires generous rules
assuring that such “poor persons’ speech” receives effective First
Amendment protection. The Supreme Court has struggled mightily
for more than seventy years to develop a coherent First Amendment
doctrine governing body rhetoric in a public forum.67 The Court’s
effort to define precisely when an exercise of body rhetoric poses a
sufficient threat to public order to warrant suppressing the speech
inevitably collapses into a subjective balancing test requiring the
weighing of a strong interest in free speech against strong interests
in maintaining public order. Such a balance is necessarily deeply
fact-dependent. Since it is up to the police in the first instance to
make the delicate call as to whether the facts justify suppression of
a mass march, a picket line, or a demonstration; and up to the trial
court to develop the definitive factual record, the Supreme Court’s
67

See, e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (reversing conviction);
Cox v. Louisiana (Cox II), 379 U.S. 579 (1965) (reversing conviction); Cox v.
Louisiana (Cox I), 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (reversing conviction); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (reversing conviction); Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315 (1951) (affirming conviction); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
(1949) (reversing conviction); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)
(affirming conviction); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (reversing
conviction); Hague v. Comm. for Idus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (granting
relief). See also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), aff’g, 477 F. Supp.
676 (N.D. Ill. 1978), stay denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978) (blocking effort to ban Nazi
march through Skokie, Illinois). But see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)
(upholding ban on congregating; invalidating ban on signs); Clark v. Cmty. For
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1982) (affirming restriction).
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conceded lack of power to review facts 68 seriously complicates its
ability to provide effective First Amendment protection to
unpopular marchers or demonstrators.69
In the seminal labor, religious, civil rights, and Vietnam War
demonstration cases before the Court, the Justices faced a major
jurisprudential challenge. Given the fact-dependent nature of the
First Amendment issues raised in the demonstration cases, the
relative weakness of the speakers and hearers, the limited appellate
power to review the facts, the Supreme Court’s conceded lack of
power to construe state statutes narrowly, and the intensely hostile
state and local law enforcement climate, it was almost impossible
for the Court to use the “as applied” substantive First Amendment
to protect important but controversial free speech movements. I
believe that the Court met the challenge by unleashing a stream of
procedural First Amendment decisions imposing prophylactic limits
on the process of speech regulation, including a ban on discretionary
parade permits,70 a requirement of equal access to public fora,71 and
the enunciation of the void-for-vagueness72 and overbreadth
doctrines73 that provided protection to weak speakers, without
asking whether the speech in question was actually protected.
It worked. Shielded under a procedural umbrella, civil rights
marchers, labor picketers, anti-Vietnam demonstrators, and
religious zealots engaged in intense bursts of First Amendment
activity without having to defend the substantive First Amendment
68

The Supreme Court’s limited capacity to challenge the facts as found
below is discussed in Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960)
(reversing conviction only because no evidence in record to support it).
69
See Cox II, 379 U.S. 559, for an example of the Court’s effort to grapple
with hostile fact-finding in a demonstration case.
70
See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 158 (1969).
71
See Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972).
72
The void-for-vagueness doctrine was initially derived from the due
process notion of fair notice of any state prohibition. Connally v. Gen. Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). The idea takes on greater intensity when the
banned behavior involves communication. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972).
73
See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). Subsequent development of
the doctrine requires “substantial overbreadth,” a showing of a significant
likelihood that protected speech will be deterred, before invoking overbreadth.
See id. at 518–19; Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
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status of their speech. It was enough to show that the disorderly
conduct statute was overbroad, the flag desecration statute was too
vague, the anti-picketing statute was selective, or the permit statute
vested too much discretion in the police. Such effective protection
came, however, with an opportunity cost. A steady diet of decisions
based on procedural corollaries impeded the development of
substantive First Amendment doctrine. Seventy years of Supreme
Court grappling with cases involving picketing, parading, and
demonstrating has left us no closer to precise substantive free speech
rules than when we started. Of course, given the undoubted success
of the procedural “facial” approach in providing effective protection
to the civil rights and anti-Vietnam movements, the opportunity cost
of relying so heavily on First Amendment procedure may well have
been worth it.
A second troubling byproduct of the Court’s development of
First Amendment overbreadth, vagueness, and equality procedural
doctrines is, however, less defensible. The Supreme Court’s
repeated invocation of the procedural corollaries appears to have
given them a life of their own, resulting in their reflexive application
in settings far from the circumstances that gave rise to their
adoption.74 The three most widely invoked First Amendment
procedural corollaries—vagueness, overbreadth, and equal
treatment—emerged from seminal cases where weak speakers,
confronted by hostile local law enforcement officials armed with
virtually unreviewable fact-finding power, were unlikely to be in a
position to launch substantive “as applied” challenges to protect
their free speech rights effectively. Three seminal cases illustrate the
genesis of the doctrines. In Thornhill v. Alabama, decided in 1940,
the Court was confronted with the arrest of an Alabama labor union
74

I have discussed two examples earlier—R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
(discussing the constitutionality of banning cross burning aimed at black
families), and United States v. Stevens (discussing the constitutionality of banning
depictions of animal cruelty). See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Citizens
United is a third notorious example. Instead of deciding the as applied question of
whether non-profit corporate campaign spending was protected, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion notes that corporations are being treated differently than
natural persons, thereby invalidating the restriction under the First Amendment
equality doctrine. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 364
(2010). The opinion never grapples with whether corporations are sufficiently
different from people to warrant different First Amendment treatment.
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official for engaging in peaceful picketing during a strike.75
Confronted with the daunting prospect of articulating a factdependent substantive right to picket peacefully that would have
been at the mercy of fact-finding by hostile local law enforcement
authorities, the Court elected the facial procedural option, reasoning
that the anti-picketing statute was unconstitutional on its face
because, at a minimum, it purported to prohibit both protected and
unprotected conduct.76
The Thornhill Court reasoned that since such an overbroad
statute might invite law enforcement officials to move against
protected activity, and might deter highly vulnerable protected
speakers from risking arrest, the defendant should be permitted to
challenge the statute on its face in order to protect the rights of future
protected speakers, even if his own conduct was not protected.77
And so, the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine was born.78
In Smith v. Goguen,79 decided in 1974, fifteen years prior to the
flag burning cases, a young man wearing an American flag patch on
the seat of his pants was charged with “casting contempt” on the
American flag in violation of the Massachusetts flag desecration
statute.80 Throughout the 1970s, the Supreme Court appeared highly
reluctant to confront the substantive question of whether the First
Amendment protected contemptuous treatment of the flag.81 As an
ACLU lawyer working on the flag desecration issue, I doubted that
five substantive pro-free speech votes existed in Smith. Instead, the
Court fixed on the inherent vagueness of the “casting contempt”
standard, observing that hostile law enforcement officials might be
moved to arrest controversial flag users in numerous contexts, many
75

Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 92–94 (1940).
Id. at 96–98, 100–01, 104.
77
Id. at 97–98, 100–01.
78
I could also have used the facts of Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 518–
19 (1972).
79
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
80
Id. at 568–69 (1974) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 5 (West
1971)).
81
In Street v. New York, confronted with a flag burning conviction, a narrow
majority strained to find that since words might have played a role in the finding
of “desecration,” the conviction must be reversed. See Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576, 591 (1969).
76
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of which would be clearly protected by the First Amendment.82 The
Court also mused that speakers wishing to use the flag in delivering
a controversial but fully protected message might be deterred by the
fear of violating such a vague statute.83 Finally, the Court held that
even if the “casting contempt” statute gave adequate notice that
wearing an American flag on the seat of your pants was forbidden,
the defendant should, nevertheless, be empowered to raise the First
Amendment rights of possible future speakers who might be
genuinely confused about the statute’s coverage, as well as possible
future speakers whose protected but controversial use of the flag
would trigger arrest from intensely hostile local police.84 The Court
concluded that the only way to protect such future speakers, who
were unlikely to be in a position to assert their own rights
effectively, would be to invalidate the flag statute as
unconstitutionally vague on its face, even though it was probably
not vague “as applied.”85 And so, the First Amendment facial
vagueness doctrine was born.
Finally, in Chicago Police Dep’t v. Mosley, decided in 1972,
Chicago banned picketing in the vicinity of a school, except when
connected to a labor dispute involving the school.86 Instead of
asking the hard, fact-bound question of whether the particular
picketing activity before the Court was or was not protected by the
First Amendment, the Court focused on the fact that Chicago had
failed to treat all picketing equally, favoring labor picketing over
other possible subjects.87 Such a content-discriminatory statute,
reasoned the Court, invited officials to discriminate against
unpopular speech, posing an unacceptably high risk of improper
censorship in the future.88 The Court concluded that the most
effective way to stop future censorship aimed at vulnerable speakers
was to invalidate the statute on its face, regardless of whether the
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speaker before the Court was engaged in protected activity.89 And
so, the First Amendment equality doctrine was born.90
The three seminal cases share the following characteristics: (1)
significant difficulty in articulating and applying a substantive First
Amendment standard; (2) substantial dependence on on-site factfinding in separating protected from unprotected activity; (3) a local
climate of police and judicial hostility to the speech in question; (4)
the presence of large numbers of relatively powerless speakers
likely to fall victim to unfair application of the law; and (5) an
inability to narrow governing state law through statutory
construction. Given such a constellation of characteristics, the Court
quite properly treated the speaker before the Court as a surrogate for
the numerous vulnerable out-of-court speakers who were unlikely
to be in a position to protect their own rights in any court. The Court
then permitted the in-court speaker to invoke the First Amendment
rights of out-of-court speakers to invalidate the speech regulation on
its face, whether or not the in-court speaker was engaged in
protected activity. While such a jus tertii process may occasionally
deliver a windfall to an unprotected speaker, and while a steady diet
of procedurally based decisions may inhibit the articulation of
substantive First Amendment standards, it enabled vulnerable outof-court speakers to receive a significant degree of First Amendment
protection that might otherwise have been beyond their reach.
The current Supreme Court appears to have forgotten why the
Court invented the doctrines of facial overbreadth, facial vagueness,
and strict equality. Compare the three seminal cases that generated
the doctrines—Thornhill, Goguen, and Mosely—with four modern
cases applying the three principal prophylactic procedural doctrines.
In United States v. Stevens, the Court invalidated a federal statute
banning so-called “animal snuff movies” depicting the brutal torture
and killing of small animals.91 Eight members of the Court noted
89
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that while the speech actually before the Court involved arguably
unprotected depictions of animal torture, the wording of the statute
could be read aggressively by an official to ban documentaries about
hunting.92 Without considering whether any of the characteristics
present in the seminal cases existed in Stevens, in a variant of the
Romeo and Juliet gambit described supra, the Court reflexively
permitted the arguably unprotected defendant to invoke the rights of
potential future makers of hunting documentaries to invalidate the
animal torture statute on its face.93 In the absence of a showing that
the Romeo and Juliet gambit was needed to protect identifiable outof-court speakers, I believe that the speaker in Stevens should have
been judged on the marginal, possibly unprotected speech before the
Court—not on the clearly protected speech of some highly unlikely
future speaker.
In Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television
Stations (“Fox Broadcasting”), the Court reviewed an Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) order imposing minor
sanctions on Fox and ABC for broadcasting fleeting depictions of
unclothed sensitive body parts in violation of a Congressional
statute banning the broadcast of “obscene, indecent, or profane”
material.94 The Court ruled that the FCC’s historic vacillation over
whether to prosecute “fleeting expletives,” deprived the broadcasters
of fair notice of the scope of the statutory prohibition, requiring
vacation of the violation on vagueness grounds, without regard to
whether the speech in question was protected by the First
Amendment.95
Unlike in the seminal cases discussed above, in Fox
Broadcasting, the Supreme Court did not invoke the First
Amendment vagueness doctrine to protect vulnerable out-of-court
speakers against intensely hostile enforcement officials, in factdependent settings beyond the Court’s control.96 Rather, the Court
invoked vagueness to duck a hard substantive First Amendment
issue involving powerful speakers fully capable of protecting their
92
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own rights in court against a well-intentioned regulatory body. Since
it is hard to argue with a straight face that the networks honestly
believed that the display of uncovered sensitive body parts might be
permitted, Fox Broadcasting was a “facial vagueness” case like
Smith v. Goguen, but without any need to invoke the doctrine.
Unlike Smith, there was no risk in Fox Broadcasting that a group of
vulnerable speakers would run afoul of bad faith, unreviewable
enforcement of the FCC regulations. The networks are perfectly
capable of fighting their own First Amendment battles. Reflexively
invoking facial vagueness in Fox Broadcasting came at the cost of
clarifying broadcasters’ and their audiences’ First Amendment
rights. After the expenditure of very substantial resources, we still
do not know whether an isolated, apparently unintentional violation
of the FCC regulations triggers First Amendment protection.
In Reed v. Gilbert, confronted with a local sign ordinance of
almost comic complexity and bureaucratic self-importance
providing widely varying rules governing different categories of
signs,97 the Court invoked the First Amendment equality principle
to invalidate the entire sign ordinance on its face, without
considering whether any violation of the First Amendment had
actually taken place, and without providing substantive guidance in
future signage cases.98 Instead, Justice Thomas’ opinion for five
members of the Reed Court imposed a stringent facial equality
requirement on any government regulation involving words that,
taken seriously, would threaten a wide range of regulatory
activities.99 Justice Thomas’ almost gleeful use of First Amendment
equality in Reed v. Gilbert comes awfully close to turning the First
Amendment into an all-purpose wrecking ball for economic
regulation whenever communication is involved.
Finally, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the
Court invalidated the century-old ban on the expenditure of
corporate treasury funds in federal elections in large part because
the statute treated corporations differently from natural persons in
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violation of the First Amendment equality doctrine.100 Justice
Kennedy’s opinion never grapples directly with whether for-profit
corporations should enjoy full First Amendment protection, or
whether treating corporations and natural persons differently was
justifiable.101 Instead, he used the overbreadth and equality doctrines
to jump to facial invalidity of the statute, despite the presence of
numerous as applied options capable of protecting the litigants’ free
speech rights.102
None of the four modern facial procedural cases display the
characteristics that led the Court to invent First Amendment
overbreadth, vagueness, and equality in the first place. Articulation
of a substantive First Amendment standard posed no particular
difficulty. Fact-finding posed no special concerns. Neither the law
enforcement agents nor trial judges involved were politically hostile
to the speakers. In three of the cases, curative statutory construction
was possible. Most important, the out-of-court woods were not full
of vulnerable speakers unable to protect their rights in court. And
yet, the Court declined to decide all four cases on the First
Amendment merits, relying instead on facial procedural corollaries
as a substitute for the hard work of as applied strict scrutiny.103
CONCLUSION
The four modern cases discussed above are not aberrations.104
First Amendment procedural doctrines, originally designed to
protect vulnerable speakers in settings where substantive review is
not likely to be effective, have slowly evolved into the First
Amendment bar’s arguments of choice. In my opinion, First
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Amendment jurisprudence would be wiser and more just if courts
faced up to the task of applying substantive strict scrutiny to the
speech before the Court, confining prophylactic procedural facial
review to settings that genuinely require it.

